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Moral philosophy

Virtue

The classical inquiry into excellence of character — what it is, how it is acquired, and how it shapes a life.

The classical inquiry

"Virtue" in the classical tradition translates the Greek aretē, a word older than philosophy. In Homer it names the excellence appropriate to a thing — the aretē of a horse is speed, the aretē of a warrior is courage in battle. The philosophical inheritance asks the harder question: what is the aretē appropriate to a human being as such?

Plato's dialogues press the question through a familiar set of candidates — wisdom, courage, temperance, justice — and in the Republic present them as the four virtues that together constitute the well-ordered soul and the well-ordered city. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics gives the question its most systematic ancient treatment: virtues of character are dispositions cultivated by habituation; each lies in a mean between an excess and a deficiency; the mean is determined by the practical wisdom (phronēsis) of the person of good character; and the whole of the virtuous life realises the human good (eudaimonia).

What the tradition adds

The Stoic schools (Cicero among their Latin transmitters) absorbed and adapted the Greek inquiry, with their own emphasis on virtue as the only true good. The Christian tradition received the four classical virtues as the cardinal virtues — prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance — and added the three theological virtues — faith, hope and love — drawn from the Pauline letters. Medieval synthesis, especially in the work of Thomas Aquinas, reads the classical virtues together with the Christian inheritance.

The twentieth century saw a revival of virtue ethics as a serious contemporary moral philosophy. The well-known starting points are Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" and Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981); Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse are central to the later development.

Why it matters for Virtue & Power

Virtue is the platform's anchor concept. We are not interested in it as a slogan or as a programme for personal optimisation. We are interested in it because the classical tradition treated the question of how to live well as a serious one, deserving careful language and serious distinctions, and because the tools that tradition built — the distinction between habit and choice, the mean, practical wisdom, the unity of the virtues — remain useful for thinking clearly about character and action today.

For the editions and reference works behind the entries that touch this theme, see our Sources page.